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Abstract
We consider a (standard) reverse auction for dual sourcing and propose to determine
both the providers’ shares and the reserve price endogenously, depending on the sup-
pliers’ bids. Since the buyer does not know the costs of providers, the revelation of
providers’ characteristics is an important concern for her. Our benchmark considers a
two-stage game of complete information. After a first round of bidding, the two most
competitive suppliers advance to the second stage and compete again with a refined
reserve price, which is based on the lowest price of the excluded providers. We show
that at the first stage providers reveal their costs truthfully. At the second stage suppliers
balance a trade-off between increasing their share and raising their mark up. Surpris-
ingly, when discarded suppliers are competitive enough, the procedure not only allows
taking advantage of dual sourcing but also generates lower procurement expenditures
than a standard auction for sole (or dual) sourcing. We also consider extensions of the
benchmark model, including to situations in which providers have private information
about their costs.
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1 Introduction
Procurement is an important part of economic activity.1 It is uncontroversial that pro-
curement should minimize costs and from a theoretical point of view the optimal mech-
anism is well understood. This mechanism, however, requires information about the
bidders’ value distributions in order to determine the optimal reserve prices. In addi-
tion, it is not anonymous, as it does not treat bidders in the same way. Consequently,
in practice relatively simple traditional reverse auctions are used.2 In this paper we
propose a new procurement procedure that is anonymous, builds on reverse auction
formats used in real-life procurement markets, and has the potential to reconcile the
conflicting aims of expenditure minimization and dual sourcing.
In some procurement markets it is not only important to minimize procurement
costs but also to avoid dependence on a single provider. Having only one supplier
risks that the buyer is ‘locked in’ with one provider and experiences shortage in the
case that this supplier cannot fulfil his obligations. Currently, for example, the state of
Texas buys influenza vaccines from Novartis and Sanofi Pasteur, while meningococcal
vaccines are provided by Sanofi Pasteur and Glaxosmithkline.3 Similarly, in the private
sector, Nokia and Toyota follow a dual sourcing strategy in order to reduce supply chain
risk.4 Since having several providers might require to forgo economies of scale or to buy
from providers with different efficiency levels, conventional wisdom holds that there is
a trade-off between expenditure minimization and a dual (or even multiple) sourcing
strategy.5 The main contribution of this paper is to propose a procurement procedure
1Procurement of government contracts represents 19.96% of GDP for OECD countries and 14.48% for
non-OECD countries, while the value of procurement transactions in the private sector is estimated to be
even larger than in the public sector, see OECD (2002) and Dimitri et al. (2006).
2In fact, Milgrom (2004) summarizes the so-called “Wilson doctrine” as arguing “that useful auction
designs must be independent of the fine details of unknowable bidder valuations and beliefs” (p. 165).
As Krishna (2010) notes, “Any mechanism that depends on the fine details of buyers’ distributions would
be difficult to implement in practice” (p. 75). Krishna defines auctions in his book to be the subset of
mechanisms that are both anonymous and universal, where a universal mechanism is one that may be
used to sell any good, as it’s rules do not depend on any specific details, like the value distributions.
Carpineti et al. (2006), Tunca and Wu (2009), or Krasnokutskaya (2011) report the use of simple tradi-
tional reverse auctions in procurement.
3See http://www.txsmartbuy.com/contracts/view/1741 and https://comptroller.texas.gov/purchasing/,
both accessed on 05/08/2018. Dual sourcing is also used in defense procurement in the US and by
Consip, the Italian central procurement agency, see Grimm et al. (2006) and Albano et al. (2006a).
Carpineti et al. (2006) report that both the US Federal Acquisition Regulation and the relevant EU
Directive regulate the concept of multiple awarding.
4See http://www.scdigest.com/assets/newsViews/07-08-15-1.php?cid=1178 and
http://www.scdigest.com/ontarget/12-03-07-2.php?cid=5576, both accessed on 05/08/2018. For
the example of Toyota, see also Richardson (1993) and Albano et al. (2006a). Albano et al. (2006a) also
report that Solectron, an electronics manufacturer, uses dual sourcing.
5See Albano et al. (2006a) or Engel et al. (2006). Albano et al. (2006a) write, “However, dual sourcing
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that results in dual sourcing but has the potential to avoid this trade-off.6
A commonly employed dual sourcing strategy is as follows.7 The buyer announces
(i) which objects or services the supply contract contains; (ii) the reserve price (or
budget constraint, or bid ceiling); and (iii) an ex-ante specified proportion, say equal
split, in which the two winning providers share the supply contract. Providers make
their bids and the two suppliers proposing the lowest prices are chosen. This procedure
results in the Vickrey outcome in which the two lowest-cost providers win a share at
the price offered by the third lowest cost provider.8 In what follows we will refer to this
sourcing strategy as Vickrey auction for dual sourcing.
We propose a procurement procedure that builds on this format but determines both
the providers’ shares and the reserve price endogenously, depending on the suppliers’
bids. The procedure assigns positive shares to the two most competitive bidders.9 Dis-
carded prices, however, are used for price discovery. The lowest discarded price is used
to replace the initial reserve price (or budget). As a consequence the initial reserve price
does not affect the equilibrium outcome and the buyer can save costly resources when
determining it. In addition, the procedure avoids setting the initial reserve price too
low and accidentally deterring participation of suppliers in the auction. To describe the
assignment rule for shares more precisely, define a supplier’s bid to be the difference
between the refined reserve price and the price of this supplier. Shares are assigned de-
pending on the relative difference of the bids of suppliers, as a percentage of the largest
bid (submitted by the supplier proposing the lowest price).
We start by considering a benchmark and formalise this idea as a two-stage game of
complete information.10 In the first stage, the price discovery stage, providers propose
prices. Based on these prices two suppliers are chosen to compete in the second stage
does not come without costs. In particular, splitting procurement (i) reduces the economics of scale of
each supplier, . . . and (ii) . . . almost certainly includes one supplier that is not at least cost” (p. 110).
Engel et al. (2006) state, “The disadvantage [of multiple sourcing] is that the price is in general higher
than with single sourcing” (p. 330).
6A related trade-off between expenditure minimization and minority representation appears in pro-
curement when there are affirmative action considerations and our procedure might be of interest in this
context, see Alcalde and Dahm (2013).
7See Engel et al. (2006), Tunca and Wu (2009) or the clearing-price auction in Cramton et al. (2015).
8See Engel et al. (2006), Tunca and Wu (2009) and Wambach (2002).
9Notice that even though only two suppliers win shares, any provider who wishes to participate can
do so. In this sense there is free entry and equal treatment of providers, which is normatively appealing.
10As observed by Albano et al. (2006b), Carpineti et al. (2006) and Tunca and Wu (2009), different
forms of two-stage processes are frequently used in real life procurement situations, including in the
privatization of the formerly state-owned industrial conglomerate ENI. One form has a second round of
bidding among the winners of the first stage. The complete information setting is considered appropriate
when providers know each other well (Moldovanu and Sela, 2003). Examples are construction contract-
ing (Bernheim and Whinston, 1986) or when technology can be considered to be stable (Anton and Yao,
1992, p. 691).
2
with the refined reserve price. In this contest stage the two providers can adjust their
initial price proposals provided that the revised price is below the refined reserve price.
We show that there is a unique weakly-stage dominant equilibrium.11 Interestingly,
providers reveal their costs truthfully at this price discovery stage. This guarantees that
procurement fulfils a (minimal) efficiency property, in the sense that the two lowest cost
providers are assigned procurement shares, rather than that a supplier with higher cost
obtains a part of the supply contract.
Moreover, we show that our procedure has the potential to avoid the trade-off be-
tween expenditure minimization and a dual sourcing. To formalise this we compare the
procurement costs of our procedure to a standard Vickrey auction for sole sourcing, in
which procurement costs are equal to the second lowest cost.12 In other words, we ask
when a buyer, who does not necessarily value dual sourcing by itself, prefers to use our
procedure. She will do so when procurement costs are lower with our procedure than
with sole sourcing, in which case the trade-off between expenditure minimization and
dual sourcing disappears. We show that our procedure has the potential to generate
very competitive procurement, because the winning suppliers are not only concerned
with outbidding their rivals and obtaining a positive share, but also compete to increase
the relative size of their shares. More precisely, we establish that if discarded suppliers
are competitive enough (as measured by the cost difference between the second and the
third lowest cost providers), then we can guarantee that procurement costs are lower
than in a standard Vickrey auction for sole sourcing.
The benchmark model can be extended in different ways. Since there are procure-
ment settings that the assumption of complete information does not seem to fit well,
we offer three extension that introduce incomplete information into our framework.
In all three extensions, we show that the existence of an equilibrium with truthful re-
serve price discovery continues to hold. The first two extensions consider the two-stage
process of the benchmark model and either provide conditions on the informational
environment or assume that suppliers are averse to loser regret. The third extension
dispenses both with restrictions on the informational environment and the assumption
of loser regret but varies the auction procedure employed. More precisely, in the third
extension we follow Edelman et al. (2007) and Alcalde and Dahm (2013) and con-
11This is an equilibrium in which, at the first stage, each supplier reports a price that weakly dominates
any other report.
12Carpineti et al. (2006) report that procurement auctions are usually organized as first-price auctions
and that many organisations do not determine the reserve price in the way the optimal mechanism
would require. A similar benchmark is used in Ewerhart and Fieseler (2003) and Alcalde and Dahm
(2013). Notice that it is sufficient to compare to a standard auction to show that it can improve over the
aforementioned Vickrey auction for dual sourcing (with exogenous shares). This is so, since the Vickrey
auction for dual sourcing generates higher procurement costs than the standard Vickrey auction for sole
sourcing, see Engel et al. (2006), Tunca and Wu (2009) and Wambach (2002).
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sider a variant of a reverse English (or Japanese) auction with rules that resemble the
two-stage process of the benchmark model.13 In such an auction the buyer decreases
the price continuously over time. Although providers initially do not have informa-
tion about each other, during the course of the auction all the relevant information is
revealed so that in equilibrium each supplier obtains the same share and payoffs as
in the benchmark. Interestingly, the dominance properties of the equilibrium in the
benchmark translate to the dynamic setting, and as a result our equilibrium differs from
Edelman et al. (2007) in that it is in weakly dominant strategies. This implies that the
procurement procedure can be used in different scenarios concerning what providers
know about each others’ costs, provided the assumption of private values holds. In the
last extension, we argue that when the buyer values dual sourcing by itself, our pro-
cedure becomes more attractive. We also discuss the risk in setting the reserve price
optimally, based on prior information, rather than refining it through price discovery.
An Appendix considers a natural extension to multiple sourcing.
Our paper determines the providers’ shares and the reserve price of the Vickrey
auction for dual sourcing endogenously. In doing so we build on Alcalde and Dahm
(2013) who restricted to the case of two suppliers and endogenized the providers’ shares
only. The assignment rule in the present paper reduces for two suppliers to a special
case (more precisely the so-called case of unit elasticity) of the Contested Procurement
Auction (CPA henceforth) that we proposed in our earlier paper.14 In the present paper
we show that in a model with more providers, the buyer can take advantage of price
discovery in order to determine the reserve price. This reduces the information required
in practice and avoids deterring participation by setting the reserve price too low. In
addition, the existence of a competitive pool of potential suppliers benefits the buyer,
because the trade-off between expenditure minimization and a dual sourcing disappears
in less demanding circumstances than in our earlier paper.
The assignment of shares also connects our paper to the literature on share and
split-award auctions that explores conditions under which sole sourcing is more advan-
tageous than a split-award (Wilson, 1979; Bernheim and Whinston, 1986; Anton and
Yao, 1989, 1992; Perry and Sákovics, 2003). A major difference is that our allocation
13This auction is a reverse auction variant of the English auction analysed in Milgrom and Weber
(1982). It differs from other descending clock auctions for divisible goods in that bidders do not specify
quantities. In our auction quantities follow from the relative prices, which are determined by the relative
drop out decisions. As observed by Albano et al. (2006b) and Tunca and Wu (2009) English reverse
auctions have become more popular in real life procurement situations. The former authors offer practical
guidelines for descending clock auctions.
14The name comes from a related solution for bankruptcy situations, the so-called Contested Garment
Principle, see Dagan (1996). Alcalde and Dahm (2013) consider a family of assignment rules that differ in
the sensitivity of a supplier’s procurement share with regard to his price. From a normative point of view,
the CPA can be motivated through a connection to the framework of bargaining with claims, because it
coincides with the relative claim-egalitarian solution (see Corchón and Dahm, 2010).
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rule for procurement shares imposes a particular structure on the trade-off a supplier
faces when deciding on his price. This allows to induce strong competition and to im-
prove upon sole sourcing.15 In contrast, Anton and Yao (1989, 1992) emphasize the
existence of high price split-award equilibria.16
The endogenous assignment of shares with our procedure also relates to the deter-
minants of the size of lots in combinatorial auctions for procurement of multiple lots,
see Grimm et al. (2006) and the literature therein. Similar to our procedure, splitting
the supply contract in several lots can reduce the risk of lock-in by inducing dual sourc-
ing. An important difference is that the size (and number of) lots are determined in
advance, before bidding takes place. Consequently, suppliers are only concerned with
outbidding rivals but not with increasing their share, as with our procedure. Instead,
the optimal size of lots resolves a trade-off between facilitating entry through smaller
lots and taking advantage of economics of scale with larger lots.17
In our benchmark providers reveal their costs truthfully at the price discovery stage.
This is because, at the contest stage, providers are constrained by the refined reserve
price (which depends on the lowest discarded price), rather than by their (own) first
stage price. Consequently, our two-stage auction results in efficient entry to the second
stage. This relates our procedure to the models of two-stage auctions of indicative
bidding by Ye (2007) and Quint and Hendricks (2017). These papers show in a different
model that efficient entry to the second stage depends on whether first-stage bids are
binding or not. The literature has also explored other ways to constrain the second
stage participants. In Perry et al. (2000) providers are constrained by their first stage
prices and the auction yields the same expected revenue as the open ascending (English)
auction. In Fujishima et al. (1999) suppliers are constrained by the least competitive
15Our paper also relates to the literature on optimal design of procurement auctions (Myerson, 1981;
Dasgupta and Spulber, 1990; Maskin and Riley, 2000). As mentioned before, however, we are interested
in the practical applicability of our procurement mechanism, which in general leads to the use of tradi-
tional reverse auctions. Consequently, our procurement procedure builds on the Vickrey auction for dual
sourcing (with exogenous shares).
16As described by McMillan (2003, p. 140) these equilibria fit well procurement by the Pentagon during
the 1980’s:
Unfortunately, the “competition” under dual sourcing was counterproductive. Each firm’s
best strategy often was to bid higher than its rival, for a firm could earn more by getting the
smaller share at a high price than by being the low bidder (Anton and Yao, 1992). Theorists
pointed out the flaw in dual sourcing at a 1986 Rand Corporation conference on defense
procurement. In 1989, the Pentagon’s Inspector General concluded that dual sourcing had
failed because it was “conducive to price gaming.”
17Inspired by Japanese auto makers Toyota and Nissan, Richardson (1993) and Richardson and
Roumasset (1995) discuss the use of dual sourcing as an instrument to improve performance of providers.
This provides incentives for high performance when some part of the share of a low performing provider
is reallocated to a high performing provider. In our model the quality of provision plays no role.
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excluded bid (rather than the most competitive as in our procedure) and the auction is
Nash outcome equivalent to the Japanese auction.18
This paper is organized as follows. The next section introduces the procurement
problem and the rule used to assign shares. Section 3 completes this model as a two-
stage process of complete information and analyses the equilibrium. Section 4 considers
extensions of this benchmark, including to incomplete information. Lastly, Section 5
offers some concluding remarks. All the proofs are relegated to the Appendix, which
also includes a discussion of multiple-sourcing.
2 The Procurement Problem
A buyer wishes to buy a certain quantity of a perfectly divisible good. The size of the
supply contract is normalized to 1. The buyer has an exogenously determined budget
b. This budget specifies the maximum amount she can spend and will be interpreted
as the reserve price. There are n > 2 potential suppliers. Each provider has a constant
average cost ci ≥ 0 and sufficient capacity to produce the whole supply contract.
As explained in the Introduction, we make the benchmark assumption that the
buyer’s only objective is to minimize procurement costs and compare our procedure
to a standard (Vickery) second-price auction for sole sourcing, in which procurement
costs are equal to the second lowest cost. We discuss the buyer’s objective function
further in Subsection 4.4.
We propose next an extension of the CPA in Alcalde and Dahm (2013) to n providers.
Suppose that, given the suppliers’ costs C = (c1, . . . , ci, . . . , cn) and the reserve price b,
suppliers choose prices P = (p1, . . . , pi, . . . , pn) at which they are willing to provide
the good. In order to introduce the Generalized Contested Procurement Auction (GCPA),
assume also that prices are increasingly ordered, i.e. for each i < n− 1, pi ≤ pi+1.19 The
GCPA allocates procurement shares to providers in the following way:
(a) if p1 < b, then each supplier receives
ϕGCPAi (P | b) =
n∑
j=i
min {pj+1, b} −min {pj, b}
j (b− p1)
, (1)
with pn+1 = b;
18Our analysis of the two-stage procedure also relates to elimination tournaments in which only win-
ners proceed to later stages (Fullerton and McAfee, 1999; Fu and Lu, 2012), and the buyer’s decision
between dual and sole sourcing relates to the choice between a lottery contests and an all-pay auction
(Fang, 2002; Epstein et al., 2013; Franke et al., 2014; Matros and Possajennikov, 2016).
19If necessary relabel the set of providers.
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(b) if p1 = b, then all suppliers reporting the lowest price share the total amount
equally at that price; and
(c) if p1 > b, then there is no provision and each provider’s share is zero.
Notice that the recursive allocation rule in (1) does not require any information about
the good or suppliers’ costs and is independent of providers’ labels. It is hence universal
and anonymous, fulfilling the criteria for practical applicability in Krishna (2010). It
also assigns equal shares in case of ties and implicitly assumes a feasibility condition,
because if a provider’s price is higher than the buyer’s budget constraint, his share is
zero.
This assignment rule in (1) reduces to the CPA for n = 2.20 Alcalde and Dahm
(2013) have shown that when two providers choose prices simultaneously, the CPA has














then in the unique equilibrium procurement costs are lower than c2, the buyer’s expen-
ditures in a Vickrey auction for sole sourcing. Notice that condition (2) is the more likely
to be fulfilled, the greater the heterogeneity of the firms, relative to how competitive
the reserve price is, as measured by the difference b − c2. This implies that the buyer
might benefit from decreasing b.
This is the starting point for the present paper. We use the third lowest price to
endogenize the reserve price and to reduce b.21 For completeness we define the third
lowest price formally as follows.
Definition 1 For any P = (p1, . . . , pi, . . . , pn), with pi ∈ [0, b] for each supplier i, the
third lowest price t̂ (P ) ∈ {p1, . . . , pi, . . . , pn} is such that
(a)
{
i : pi ≤ t̂ (P )
}
has at least three suppliers; and
(b)
{
h : ph < t̂ (P )
}
has at most two suppliers.
To illustrate this definition, notice that when p1 ≤ p2 ≤ p3 ≤ · · · ≤ pn ≤ b holds, we
have that t̂ (P ) = p3 even if p2 = p3 or p1 = p3. We now use the so defined third lowest
price to replace b in the GCPA, that is, the allocation rule is ϕGCPAi
(
P | t̂ (P )
)
. Provided
p2 < p3, this results in dual sourcing, as the lowest and the second lowest bidder receive
positive shares. We discuss a natural extension to multiple sourcing in Appendix A.5.
20In addition, it preserves the desirable mathematical properties of the rule for two suppliers. Specifi-
cally, it is continuous (everywhere but when all the providers set their price equal to the reserve price b)
and the shares are monotonic in bids. Lastly, the assignment is homogeneous, that is, it is independent
of the numéraire employed.
21Decreasing b to b′ based on prior information risks reducing the reserve price too much, deterring
entry and inhibiting competition, see Carpineti et al. (2006). Using the third lowest price to reduce b
avoids this. We discuss this issue further in Subsection 4.4.
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3 Truthful Reserve Price Discovery
As observed in the Introduction, some commonly employed procurement procedures
include two-stage processes that have a second round of bidding among the winners of
the first stage. In this section we propose such a mechanism and complete the model of
the previous section as a two-stage process of complete information.22 More precisely,
we assume that it is common knowledge among suppliers that
c1 < c2 < · · · < cn < b. (3)
Similar to Bernheim and Whinston (1986) or Anton and Yao (1989), we assume that the
buyer does not know the costs of providers.23 In the next section we discuss extensions
of this basic framework.
The two-stage game works as follows. In the first stage, the price discovery stage,
suppliers are asked to reveal their true marginal cost. The two most efficient providers
are selected to compete in the second stage. In this second stage, the contest stage, the
two providers compete in the Contested Procurement Auction CPA (Alcalde and Dahm,
2013), with the buyer’s reserve price endogenously determined by the third lowest
report in the price discovery stage.
We show that this procedure induces truthful reporting at the price discovery stage.
The intuition for this is as follows. First, it is not beneficial to exaggerate costs, as it
harms the prospect of progressing to the second stage. Second, the reason why it is
not beneficial to understate costs follows the logic of King Solomon’s Dilemma, as for-
malized by Glazer and Ma (1989): if a supplier claims to be more efficient than he
really is, he risks to compete in the contest stage under the conditions of his report. The
contest stage depends on his report through the endogenous reserve price. This implies
that reporting a price below costs risks ending up with negative profits. Notice that
truthful reporting at the price discovery stage requires that the organizer can commit
to ignore the information revealed during the course of the auction.24 This is not unre-
alistic. Lengwiler and Wolfstetter (2006) describe an electronic bid submission system
22 In Alcalde and Dahm (2016) we analyse a simultaneous-move game of complete information and
show that there is a multiplicity of undominated Nash equilibria in each of which the two lowest cost
providers are assigned shares. We are grateful to a referee for the observation that the two-stage process
of the present section can be understood as selecting one of these equilibria.
23 We assume that the (initial) exogenous reserve price b is not very competitive, so that condition (3)
holds. This allows us to show how the reserve price can be refined through the procurement procedure, so
that procurement becomes more competitive without deterring entry. Subsection 4.4 explains that, since
the buyer does not know the costs of providers, adjusting the reserve price based on prior information
risks deterring participation. Condition (3) excludes equalities for simplicity. A situation in which c1 = c2,
for example, is less interesting for us, as then the trade-off between expenditure minimization and dual
sourcing disappears.
24A Vickrey auction also has the feature that the final price might be very different from the willingness
to pay (or cost in our setting) revealed during the auction. Indeed, Hoffman (2011) describes three
8
that makes it impossible to replace a bid without leaving a trace. With such a system in
place the buyer cannot replace the third lowest report at the price discovery stage with
a more competitive price that is high enough not to affect the selection of suppliers for
the second stage.25
We formalize this two-stage game as follows. We start with some notation. Us-
ing Definition 1, for a given vector of prices P = (p1, . . . , pi, . . . , pn), define A (P ) ={
i : pi < t̂ (P )
}
, and B (P ) =
{
i : pi = t̂ (P )
}
. Lastly, similar to Glazer and Ma (1989, p.
225) we introduce a parameter ε > 0. The role of this fixed parameter will become clear
shortly, so at this point we only remark that ε is determined by the buyer as part of the
procurement procedure and that for interpretative purposes we think of this number as
being very small. More precisely, we assume that such that ε < |ci − cj| for any pair of
suppliers i 6= j.
Definition 2 The CPA with entry game ΓE is a two-stage game. The n suppliers con-
stitute the set of players. At the price discovery stage, each provider reports a price
pi ∈ [0, b]. Given the reported prices, P = (p1, . . . , pi . . . , pn), two suppliers advance to
the contest stage, according to the rules below. At the contest stage, both providers
revise their price selecting
ri ∈
[
0, t̂ (P )
]
. (4)








∣∣ t̂ (P ) + ε) ,
where P E is the vector in which the entry at position h is rh if h is one of the suppliers
participating in the contest stage, and pEh = ph + ε otherwise.













where pEi is the entry at position i in the vector P
E.
To conclude the description of ΓE we explain now how the competitors at the contest
stage are selected.
New Zealand auctions where bidders paid far less than their bid price, including the radio spectrum in
1990. For the latter auction it was revealed that, because of the second-price design, a bidder only paid
NZ$401,000 even though his willingness to pay was NZ$2,371,000.
25Implicitly we also assume that suppliers are prevented from colluding with each other.
26Notice that the revised reserve price exceeds the upper bound of the prices at the contest stage by
ε > 0. This is a technical condition needed to apply Theorem 2 in Alcalde and Dahm (2013) that allows us
to conclude that the contest stage is dominance solvable. It also guarantees that the shares in the contest
stage are strictly positive. Nevertheless, given that ε is assumed to be very small, for interpretative
purposes we will think of the revised reserve price as coinciding with the third most efficient price report
of the price discovery stage.
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(a) If A (P ) has two elements, then the competitors at the contest stage are the sup-
pliers in A (P ).
(b) If A (P ) is a singleton, then one of the competitors at the contest stage is the
supplier in A (P ). The other provider is selected with equal probability from the
suppliers in B (P ).
(c) If A (P ) is empty, then the two competitors at the contest stage are selected with
equal probability from the suppliers in B (P ).
In our analysis of ΓE we focus on Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibria (SPNE hence-
forth), applying a backward induction argument. Similarly to, for example, Baron and
Kalai (1993) or Austen-Smith and Banks (2005, Section 4.1), we apply a notion of
weak-stage dominance to the price discovery stage. In order to define such a notion
for the first stage of ΓE, however, it is not necessary to assume that providers anticipate
equilibrium play in the second stage. More precisely, the following observations are
sufficient. Given a price vector P from the price discovery stage and conditional on
competing at the contest stage, a provider i anticipates the following about the contest
stage, independently with whom he competes and what price his rival sets.
Observation 1 At the contest stage each provider i anticipates:
(a) If ci > t̂ (P ), then any ri ≤ t̂ (P ) implies that the provider receives a strictly positive
share at a price strictly below cost, and obtains a strictly negative profit.
(b) If ci = t̂ (P ), then any ri < t̂ (P ) again implies losses, and the best the supplier can
do is setting ri = t̂ (P ), which guarantees zero profits.
(c) If ci < t̂ (P ), then setting ri = (ci+ t̂ (P ))/2 yields a strictly positive share at a price
exceeding costs, and thus strictly positive profits (even though this might not the
equilibrium price in the anticipated subgame).
Given that providers anticipate Observation 1, we apply the usual notion of weak dom-
inance to the first stage. That is, for provider i given, we say that price report p∗i
weakly dominates p′i at the price discovery stage whenever for all price report vectors
P−i = (pj)j 6=i of his rivals Πi (p
∗
i , P−i) ≥ Πi (p′i, P−i) holds, with strict inequality for some
P−i. A price report that weakly dominates any other price report is said to be weakly
dominant. We say that an equilibrium for ΓE is a weakly-stage dominant equilibrium, if
each provider selects a weakly dominant price report at the price discovery stage. The
following theorem describes the unique equilibrium by showing that the truthful price
report pi = ci is weakly dominant, which allows to apply the results from Alcalde and
Dahm (2013) to the second stage.
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Theorem 1 Assume that providers select weakly dominant price reports at the price
discovery stage. Then, ΓE has a unique SPNE which is fully characterized by (1) suppliers
reporting their marginal cost truthfully at the price discovery stage and (2) the contest
stage being dominance solvable.
In addition, the buyer’s procurement expenditures are lower than c2 whenever
c2 − c1












The proof of Theorem 1 is relegated to Appendix A.1.
Notice that condition (6) improves upon condition (2), as c3 +ε < b. This shows that
the existence of a competitive pool of potential suppliers and endogenizing the reserve
price through the two-stage procedure ΓE is beneficial for the buyer, compared to the
Contested Procurement Auction with only two suppliers.
We conclude this section by pointing out that ΓE also admits equilibria in which
providers use a weakly dominated price report at the price discovery stage. This, how-
ever, is not surprising. It is well known that standard Vickrey auctions also admit equi-
libria in which suppliers employ a weakly dominated strategy.
Example 1 There are three suppliers with costs C = (50, 100, 110) and the buyer’s bud-
get constraint is b = 150.
Firstly, consider a standard sealed-bid second-price auction for sole sourcing among
the two most efficient suppliers. Notice that the price pair (100, 50) is a Nash equilibrium
in which both providers use a weakly dominated strategy and the most efficient supplier
is not selected.
Secondly, consider a sealed-bid Vickrey auction for dual sourcing among all three
providers, in which the two winning suppliers provide their shares at the highest price.
Suppose winners obtain equal shares. Notice that the price vector (100, 110, 100) is
a Nash equilibrium in which all providers use a weakly dominated strategy and the
second most efficient supplier is not selected.
Lastly, consider ΓE. On one hand, notice that the first stage price report triplet
(100, x, 100) with x ∈ [110, b] is part of an equilibrium in which all providers use a
weakly dominated price report at the price discovery stage and the second most efficient
supplier does not proceed to the contest stage.27 On the other hand, the focus on weakly
27Notice that the construction of such an equilibrium requires in addition to the use of weakly domi-
nated strategies the following two features that we find unreasonable. First, supplier 3 must ‘pre-empt’
provider 2 by reporting a price of at most c2, as otherwise provider 2 could profitably deviate and lower
his report sufficiently to proceed to the contest stage. Second, supplier 2 must make this ‘pre-emption’
profitable for provider 3 by fixing the reserve price high enough. In other words, supplier 2 can avoid
the coordination on such an equilibrium by managing the beliefs of his rivals in such a way that they are
certain that he reports a price strictly below c3.
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undominated price reports yields –as in Vickrey auctions– a unique prediction. The
reserve price is revised to t̂ (P ) = 110, providers 1 and 2 proceed to the contest stage,
and the final provision prices (as ε → 0) are r∗1 = 97.75 and r∗2 = 105.00. Procurement
shares are 80% for provider 1 and 20% for supplier 2, while expenditures are 99.23 < c2.
4 Extensions
This section considers several extensions of the two-stage process of Section 3. The first
three relax the assumption of complete information in different ways. Subsection 4.4
discusses the optimal reserve price and the buyer’s objective function.
4.1 The two-stage process with private information
In this subsection we introduce private information about costs into the two-stage pro-
cess of Section 3. We provide conditions on the informational environment under which
an equilibrium with truthful reserve price discovery similar to Theorem 1 exists.
We assume that providers have private information about their true costs ĉi. Suppose
there is a finite number of potential technologies Ti with i = 1, . . . , n. The lower the sub-
index i, the more efficient the technology. It is common knowledge that each technology
Ti allows to produce with average costs in some interval [ci, ci] with ci < ci+1. Note that
this hypothesis is similar to that by Landsberger et al. (2001) in that the ranking of costs
is common knowledge. To complete the description, let us assume that associated to
each technology Ti there is a continuous probability density function fi : [ci, ci]→ R+.
Broadly speaking, the mechanism considered in this subsection is similar to the CPA
with entry game in Section 3. Each supplier announces a price at the price discovery
stage. These price reports determine the revised reserve price and the identity of the
providers competing at the contest stage. The price reports itself, however, are not
made public. The suppliers participating at the contest stage share the supply contract
based on their revised prices. Since suppliers do not have perfect information about all
relevant parameters, the game considered in this subsection differs formally from that
introduced in Definition 2. We refer to this game as the modified CPA with entry game
and denote it by ΓmE. Our equilibrium concept is Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE
henceforth).
We now introduce a condition under which the analysis of the contest stage becomes
tractable. It establishes that
ĉ3 + ε− c2
ĉ3 + ε− E (c2)
≤ ĉ3 + ε− c1








is the expected value of c2. Appendix A.2 offers a discussion of the difficulties that arise
in settings in which Condition (C1) does not hold. Notice, however, that Condition (C1)
is more likely to hold, the more precise the information about the cost of provider 2 is.
In particular, when |c2 − c2| → 0, Condition (C1) always holds.
With these considerations in mind we can establish the following result.28
Theorem 2 Assume that providers select weakly dominant price reports at the price
discovery stage. Then, when Condition (C1) holds, the modified CPA with entry game
ΓmE has a PBE, which is described as follows. First, at the price discovery stage each
provider reports pi = ĉi; and second, the Bayesian equilibrium for the contest stage is
described by
r2 (c2) =
ĉ3 + ε+ c2
2
r1 (c1) = ĉ3 + ε−
√
(ĉ3 + ε− c1) (ĉ3 + ε− E (c2))
4
Appendix A.2 proposes a formal proof for Theorem 2.
The intuition for Theorem 2 is as follows. As a result of the price discovery stage only
the revised reserve price and the identity of the suppliers participating at the contest
stage are revealed. In particular, the prices selected are revealed to the buyer but not to
the rivals. As a consequence, the arguments provided in Observation 1 are still valid for
the game ΓmE and each provider selects pi = ĉi at the price discovery stage, revealing
his true marginal cost to the buyer (but not to the other providers). Thus, providers
1 and 2 advance to the contest stage and the revised budget constraint becomes b̂ =
t̂ (P )+ε = ĉ3+ε. The role of Condition (C1) is to make sure that behaviour at the contest
stage is consistent. Since suppliers know that ĉ1 < ĉ2, in the equilibrium constructed,
provider 2 behaves as if his revised price is higher than the one selected by provider 1.
Consequently, his revised price is bounded by
ĉ3 + ε+ c2
2
≤ r2 =
ĉ3 + ε+ ĉ2
2
≤ ĉ3 + ε+ c2
2
.
28We conjecture that the Bayesian equilibrium for the contest stage, described in Theorem 2 below,
is unique. Uniqueness would imply that the existence of a small amount of uncertainty about the costs
of rivals prevents providers to select weakly dominated price reports at the price discovery stage in the
context of Example 1. A similar result is true in the Vickrey auction with binding reserve price, see Blume
and Heidhues (2004).
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When Condition (C1) holds, provider 1’s best reply to supplier 2’s optimal revised price
is indeed lower than r2 (c2) for each c2 ∈ [c2, c2]. Example 2 in Appendix A.2 illustrates
the consequences and computational difficulties that arise when Condition (C1) does
not hold.
4.2 The CPA with entry, incomplete information, and loser regret
In the modified CPA with entry game of the previous subsection, the informational
environment is restricted and the price reports at the price discovery stage are not made
public. In this subsection we consider a more general informational setting and allow
for all information to be revealed. We explain that when loser regret is an important
enough consideration at the discovery stage, an equilibrium with truthful reserve price
discovery similar to Theorem 1 exists.
Consider that each provider’s cost is private information, that the price reports at
the price discovery stage are made public, and that similar to Engelbrecht-Wiggans
(1989), Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Katok (2007, 2008) or Filiz-Ozbay and Ozbay (2007)
suppliers are loss (or regret) averse. In the two-stage process of Section 3 two types
of regret can appear.29 On one hand, supplier i might have loser regret, because a
pair of suppliers j and k report prices, say pj < pk, at the discovery stage and advance
to the contest stage, even though ci < pk holds. Hence, provider i missed out on a
positive profit that he could have earned by reporting a lower price and advancing to
the contest stage. On the other hand, supplier i might have winner regret, because he
advances to the contest stage but all permissible prices are lower than his cost. In such
a case provider i is certain to make losses that could have been avoided by reporting a
higher price at the discovery stage. In Appendix A.3 we formalize these considerations.
We show that when regret is an important enough consideration at the discovery stage,
then there is a symmetric equilibrium in which suppliers report their marginal costs
truthfully at the first stage and the contest stage is played under complete information.
4.3 A reverse English auction of incomplete information
The previous two subsections either restrict the informational environment or assume
loser regret in order to introduce private information in the two-stage process of Section
3. In this subsection we dispense with both assumptions but vary the auction procedure
employed. Again, we derive an equilibrium with truthful reserve price discovery similar
to Theorem 1.
29In the aforementioned (forward) first-price sealed-bid auctions two related types of regret appear.
Winner regret refers to a winner paying more than the second highest bid, while loser regret appears
when a loser has a higher value than what the winner paid for the object.
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More precisely, we follow Edelman et al. (2007) and Alcalde and Dahm (2013) and
consider a variant of a reverse English auction with rules that resemble the two-stage
process of Section 3. We assume that each supplier only has (private) information about
his own costs, but does not know the costs of his rivals. We analyse a simple continuous-
time version of our procedure that is easily implementable through the increased ability
to communicate in real time via the Internet. During the course of the auction, infor-
mation about rivals is not needed, because all the relevant information is revealed. In
particular, discarded suppliers reveal their costs truthfully. As a result, at the unique
equilibrium the procurement shares and profits of providers coincide with those in the
complete information environment of Theorem 1.
Since the procedure is based on an electronic reverse auction, we refer to it as ‘Elec-
tronic Procurement’ mechanism. We describe the corresponding game ΓEP as follows.
Definition 3 The ‘Electronic Procurement’ game ΓEP is a continuous-time mechanism.
The n suppliers constitute the set of players. At each moment m ∈ [0, 1] all providers
simultaneously select their messages (or actions) aim ∈ {0, 1}, where 0 is interpreted as
‘continuing’ and 1 as ‘stopping’. We denote by mi the first moment at which i selects
aimi = 1, that is, aimi = 1 and aim = 0 for each m < mi.
Given the sequence of actions of providers, supplier i’s price is given by
pi = (1−mi) b, (7)
where b is the initial (exogenous) reserve price. At m = 1 the auction closes and we
interpret this as all suppliers choosing at this moment message 1.30 At the conclusion
of the auction all prices are hence determined in an indirect way through equation (7)
and each supplier’s procurement share follows




P | t̂ (P )
)
, (8)
where t̂ (P ) was introduced in Definition 1. His profit is thus given by
ΠEPi (P ) = S
EP
i (P ) (pi − ci) . (9)
Given the definition of the game ΓEP, we formalize now the assumptions on ob-
servability and the informational structure, which are common knowledge. Following
Edelman et al. (2007) we assume that average costs ci are independently drawn from
a continuous distribution F (·) on [0, b] with a continuous density function f(·) that is
positive everywhere on (0, b). Initially, at moment m = 0, each provider i knows only his
30That is, we use the convention that pi = 0 when aim = 0 for each m ∈ [0, 1]. Notice also that
once supplier i selects aim = 1 his price is determined. Therefore, his actions at any m > mi are
inconsequential.
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own costs ci, the distribution of other firms’ costs, and the initial (exogenous) reserve
price b. In particular, we suppose that suppliers do not know their rivals’ costs. During
the course of the auction, however, additional information about providers is revealed,
because the message of each supplier at each moment in time is observable by all other
providers. Hence, at each moment m ∈ [0, 1] each provider i knows the messages se-
lected by all suppliers at any m′ < m. We represent supplier i’s relevant information at
any m ∈ [0, 1] by
Ii (m) =
(
ci, L (m) , (mj)j /∈L(m)
)
, (10)
where L (m) denotes the set of providers whose prices are still undetermined; i.e. j ∈
L (m) if for each m′ < m, ajm′ = 0. The last entry in (10), the collection of mj for
j /∈ L (m), are the drop out decisions of the remaining providers, which are observable
and determine the prices of these suppliers.
A strategy for provider i prescribes for each m̃ ∈ [0, 1) an action aim̃ that depends
both on m̃, which determines the current price, and on the provider’s current informa-
tion, which is collected in Ii (m̃). Consider the strategy described by
a∗ =
{




α (Ii (m̃)) =

ci if |L (m̃) | ≥ 3
t̂(P )+ci
2







and δ is the second-lowest price; i.e. δ = (1−m) b, where m is such that L (m) has
two providers and, for any m with m < m ≤ m̃, L (m) is a singleton. The strategy a∗
requires the provider to remain active until the price drops below a certain threshold.
This threshold depends on the number of suppliers remaining in the auction. If more
than two suppliers remain active, then the provider waits until his marginal cost is
reached. If all but one other supplier have dropped out, then the provider shades his
bid by dropping out earlier. These drop out decisions mimic the revised provision prices
in the contest stage of Theorem 1. We have the following result.
Proposition 1 In game ΓEP, it is a weakly dominant strategy to follow a∗.
The proof of Proposition 1 is relegated to Appendix A.4.
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The intuition why the strategy a∗ is weakly dominant is simple. First, as in a standard
English auction, it cannot be optimal to continue when the price falls below marginal
costs, as this can only result in a loss. Also, dropping out before the price reaches
marginal costs risks forgoing potential gains and cannot be optimal either. Second,
once only two providers are left, the key observation is the following. The supplier
dropping out first is certain to submit the second lowest price, and the optimal second
lowest price does not depend on the lowest price. Third, once only one supplier is left,
he observes the drop out decisions and thus prices of all other providers. He shades his
bid compared to what would be his optimal second lowest price, resolving optimally the
trade-off between procurement share and mark up.
When all providers follow the weakly dominant strategy a∗ each supplier i > 2
reveals his costs truthfully by choosing pi = ci. This implies that the revised reserve
price coincides with c3. The last two suppliers shade their bid and drop out earlier than
ci. Since these drop out decisions mimic the revised provision prices in the contest stage
of Theorem 1, in the unique equilibrium the procurement shares and profits of providers
coincide with those in the complete information environment of Theorem 1. We record
this with the following result; the proof is immediate taking into account Proposition 1
and Theorem 1.




ci if i ≥ 3
c3 + c2
2
if i = 2
c3 −
√
(c3 − c2) (c3 − c1)
4
















then the buyer’s procurement expenditures are lower than c2.
Notice that the payoff equivalence between the games ΓEP and ΓE is very similar
to the one between the simultaneous-move game of complete and the extensive-form
game of incomplete information in Edelman et al. (2007). One difference, however, is
that their equilibrium of the extensive-form game is not in weakly dominant strategies.
The fact that providers have a weakly dominant strategy implies that the procure-
ment procedure can be used under different assumptions of what providers know about
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each others’ marginal costs, provided the assumption of private values holds. If, how-
ever, there is interdependence of providers’ costs, the drop out decisions of rivals might
reveal information about a supplier’s cost and it is not weakly dominant to follow the
strategy a∗.
4.4 The Buyer’s Objectives and the Optimal Reserve Price
The analysis so far has made the benchmark assumption that the buyer’s only objec-
tive is to minimize procurement costs. This simplification has two advantages. First, it
makes our result, that the buyer might prefer to use our procedure rather than a stan-
dard Vickrey auction for sole sourcing, more surprising than the alternative assumption
that dual sourcing has value by itself. We are able to follow this approach, because un-
der condition (6) in Theorem 1, our procedure induces very competitive procurement,
so that the trade-off between expenditure minimization and dual sourcing disappears.
Second, it offers a clear benchmark of comparison. Alternatively, we could postulate an
objective function for the buyer that specifies how she trades-off expenditure minimiza-
tion and the benefits of dual sourcing. But doing so would yield results that depend on
the specific formalization of the buyer’s objectives. Since valuing dual sourcing would
provide additional incentives for dual sourcing, condition (6) in Theorem 1 would be
relaxed and our procedure would become more attractive.
One important reason for why a buyer might value dual sourcing by itself is that
it helps to manage the risk that a supplier cannot fulfil the contractual obligations.
This causes delays and in the extreme the buyer might be unable to obtain provision.31
Consider a buyer who values dual sourcing by itself, because it reduces the risk of
having no provision. In such a situation our procedure with endogenous reserve price
through price discovery is very attractive, because the buyer ‘can play it safe’, set a high
initial reserve price, and refine it through the procurement procedure in such a way that
entry is not deterred and provision is guaranteed. Alternatively, the buyer could use
our procedure but set the reserve price optimally, based on prior information. Besides
having the practical disadvantages described in the Introduction, doing so risks setting
the reserve price too low and to deter participation, resulting in high procurement cost
31Engel et al. (2006) discuss that bankruptcy costs of providers cause important costs for the buyer
and how sourcing to more than one contractor can manage this risk. Another reason for why a
supplier might not be able to fulfil the contractual obligations is that the regulator might suspend
the license. In the autumn of 2004, the U.S. experienced a severe influenza vaccine shortage, be-
cause one of two suppliers (Chiron) failed to produce the expected half of the necessary vaccines.
For an account and a discussion that such a risk can be mitigated by increasing the number of con-




and sole sourcing or no provision at all. Consequently, when it is sufficiently important
to avoid failure of provision, the buyer will prefer to refine the reserve price through
price discovery.
5 Concluding Remarks
This paper has proposed a new procurement procedure for dual sourcing. Commonly
employed dual sourcing strategies fix procurement shares and the reserve price exoge-
nously. In contrast, our procedure uses the bids of suppliers in order to endogenize both
the allocation of shares and the reserve price. We have formalised this idea in different
ways and shown that in equilibrium providers reveal their costs truthfully, so that the
two most competitive suppliers are awarded contracts. When discarded suppliers are
competitive enough, the procedure not only allows taking advantage of dual sourcing
but also generates lower procurement expenditures than a standard auction for sole
(or dual) sourcing. Moreover, the procedure can be used under different assumptions
of what providers know about each others’ costs, provided the assumption of private
values holds.
There are several interesting ways in which our analysis might be extended. In par-
ticular, our assignment rule for shares assumes the elasticity of a supplier’s procurement
share with respect to his price to be one. Following Alcalde and Dahm (2013) this could
be generalized to other values of the elasticity. The results in our earlier paper suggest
that under such a generalization truthful revelation of marginal costs of discarded bids
still occurs in equilibrium. Theorem 3 in Alcalde and Dahm (2013) implies then that the
buyer can choose the elasticity in such a way that procurement expenditures are lower
than in a Vickrey auction for sole sourcing, even when in the setting of the present paper
(with unit elasticity) this is not possible. This shows that different assignment rules for
shares might yield further interesting results.
We also assumed that the providers’ marginal costs are constant. Introducing
economies of scale poses a challenge, as it should make it more difficult to reconcile
the aims of expenditure minimization and having more than one provider. But the lat-
ter can still be desirable. Scherer (2007), for instance, analyses for influenza vaccines
the trade-off between economies of scale and protection against stochastic shortage risk
through having more than one provider. He concludes that for plausible scenarios sole
sourcing is not optimal. We leave these extensions for future work.
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A Appendix
A.1 Proof of Theorem 1
This Appendix provides a proof of Theorem 1. We first show that at the price discovery
stage for each supplier i the truthful price report pi = ci is weakly dominant. To do so,
we proceed in two steps (Lemma 1 and Lemma 2). We turn then to the derivation of
the threshold in condition (6).
Lemma 1 For each supplier i any price report pi < ci is weakly dominated by p′i = ci.
Proof. Consider a given supplier, say i, a price report vector P−i = (pj)j 6=i of his rivals,
and let p(1) and p(2) be the lowest competing prices. More precisely, let p(1) ≤ p(2) ≤ pj
for each j /∈ {(1) , (2) , i}. We assume 0 ≤ pi < p′i = ci and consider the following cases,
which exhaust all the possibilities.
(a) p′i < p(2). Then i ∈ A (P ) and i ∈ A (P ′), so that with both reports i proceeds to
the second stage. Moreover, t̂ (P ) = t̂ (P ′), and hence Πi (pi, P−i) = Πi (p′i, P−i).
(b) p(2) < pi. Then with both reports provider i does not proceed to the second stage
and obtains zero profits.
(c) pi ≤ p(2) < p′i. In this case provider i proceeds with some positive probability to
the second stage when reporting pi, but does not proceed when reporting p′i. In
the latter case his profits are zero. In the former case i’s profit is strictly negative,
as ci > t̂ (P ).
(d) p(2) = p′i. Then i ∈ A (P ) and i ∈ B (P ′), so that reporting pi supplier i is certain
to proceed to the second stage, while reporting p′i supplier i only proceeds with a
positive probability to the second stage. Since however t̂ (P ′) = t̂ (P ) = ci, profits
are zero when proceeding to the second stage and hence Πi (pi, P−i) = Πi (p′i, P−i).
Note that in all cases it is weakly better to report p′i rather than pi, with a strict pref-
erence in case (c). Hence, any price report pi < ci is weakly dominated by p′i = ci.
Lemma 2 For each supplier i any price report pi > ci is weakly dominated by p′i = ci.
Proof. Consider a given supplier, say i, and a price report vector P−i = (pj)j 6=i of his
rivals, and let p(1) and p(2) be the lowest competing prices. More precisely, let p(1) ≤
p(2) ≤ pj for each j /∈ {(1) , (2) , i}. We assume ci = p′i < pi and consider the following
cases, which exhaust all the possibilities.
24
(a) p′i < pi < p(2). Then i ∈ A (P ) and i ∈ A (P ′), so that with both reports i proceeds
to the second stage. Moreover, t̂ (P ) = t̂ (P ′), and hence Πi (pi, P−i) = Πi (p′i, P−i).
(b) p′i < p(2) < pi. In this case reporting p
′
i supplier i proceeds to the second stage and
obtains a strictly positive profit, as t̂ (P ′) > ci. On the other hand, reporting pi his
profits are zero, because he does not proceed to the second stage.
(c) p′i < p(2) = pi. Then ci < t̂ (P
′) = t̂ (P ), and provider i strictly prefers to report p′i,
as reporting pi he does not always proceed to the second stage.
(d) p(2) < p′i < pi. Then with both reports provider i does not proceed to the second
stage and obtains zero profits.
(e) p(2) = p′i < pi. Then, when reporting p
′
i supplier i has a positive probability of
proceeding to the second stage in which case his profit is zero, as t̂ (P ′) = ci.
Reporting pi his profits are also zero, because he does not proceed to the second
stage.
Note that in all cases it is weakly better to report p′i rather than pi, with a strict prefer-
ence in cases (b) and (c). Hence, any price report pi > ci is weakly dominated by p′i = ci.
To find the threshold described in equation (6), under which the buyer’s procurement
expenditures do not exceed c2, we proceed as follows. Lemmata 1 and 2 above imply
that for each supplier i report pi = ci weakly dominates every other report at the price
discovery stage. Thus, t̂ (P ) = c3, and providers 1 and 2 compete at the contest stage.
Each of them has to select a revised price ri ∈ [0, c3], while procurement shares are
assigned based on the slightly higher reserve price b̂ = c3+ε, as explained in footnote 26.
Theorems 1 and 2 in Alcalde and Dahm (2013) imply that this subgame is dominance
solvable and has a unique equilibrium.
This unique equilibrium (for the contest stage), say r∗ = (r∗1, r
∗



















and supplier 1 obtains the share SE1 = 1− SE2 .








































≤ c2. Taking into
































































































This completes the proof of Theorem 1.
A.2 Proof of Theorem 2
This Appendix deals with the analysis of the modified CPA with entry game from Sub-
section 4.1. We first discuss the difficulties of computing an equilibrium, if it exists,
when Condition (C1) does not hold. Then we provide a formal proof for Theorem 2.
As explained in the main text, the arguments in Appendix A.1 can be adapted to
show that each provider has a weakly dominant price report at the price discovery stage,
namely to truthfully reveal his cost pi (ci) = ci. This allows to consider the contest stage
subgame as a standard private values setting, in which the players are suppliers 1 and
2. The cost of each supplier is drawn from the cumulative distribution Fi with support
[ci, ci]. Associated to each Fi there is a positive continuous density fi : [ci, ci]→ R+.
A strategy for provider i = 1, 2 at the contest stage subgame, is a function




associating a revised price to each value of his cost.
At the contest stage, given the revised price ri ∈
[
0, t̂ (P )
]
submitted by each












 [ri − ci] otherwise . (15)
Assume that provider j follows the increasing and differentiable equilibrium strategy
rj (cj) and also that provider i, given the realization of his costs ci, submits ri. We wish
to determine the optimal ri.
Supplier i is the high-cost provider (and thus the first row in equation (15) is rele-
vant) whenever ri ≥ rj (cj), and is the low-cost provider otherwise. His expected payoff
from submitting ri is hence
















 [ri − ci] fj (cj) dcj
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. If such a value does not exist,
we set c∗j = cj if ri > rj (cj), and c
∗





By maximizing the latter expression we get the first order condition
∫ c∗j
cj
















 fj (cj) dcj = 0. (16)
Notice that for ri = b̂ both terms on the left hand side of equation (16) are negative,
while for ri = ci both terms are positive. Since both terms are continuous functions of
ri, we can apply Bolzano’s Theorem and conclude that a solution to (16) exists. Note
also, however, that it is not possible to find this solution analytically. Even assuming
symmetry, that is, [c1, c1] = [c2, c2] and Fi = F for i = 1, 2, so that it is natural to focus
on a symmetric equilibrium does not simplify the problem sufficiently.
Let us go further and assume that, since c1 < c2, providers 1 and 2 believe that the
realized revised prices should satisfy r1 < r2, which is very intuitive. Supplier 2 is the
high-cost provider and expects the first row in (15) to be relevant, while provider 1 is
the low-cost provider and expects the second row to be relevant. Supplier 2’s first order






solves this equation. On the other hand, provider 1’s first order condition is given by
(16) with i = 1, j = 2 and c∗2 = c2. Using (17) in this expression, it can be shown that
the first order condition holds for
r1 (c1) = b̂−
√√√√(b̂− c1)(b̂− E (c2))
4
. (18)
Notice that provider 1’s strategy in (18) is increasing both in c1 and E (c2). Moreover,
replacing E (c2) by c1 we obtain that the revised price is the same function of cost as
in (17). This shows that provider 1 optimally shades the price to trade-off the share
of provision with the mark-up. In addition, supplier 1’s information is imprecise and
it might turn out that, for some realizations of random variable c2, say ĉ2, E (c2) > ĉ2
holds. In such a situation the revised price is even less competitive than it would be
under complete information. As a result of both effects suppliers might revise their
prices expecting that the revised prices satisfy r1 < r2 but the actual choices violate
this condition, because provider 1’s price is not competitive enough. We illustrate this
possibility with the following example.
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Example 2 Let each ci be uniformly distributed on [ci, ci], and thus fi (ci) = (ci − ci)
−1.
Let [c1, c1] = [37, 42] and [c2, c2] = [43, 49]. The revised reserve price is b̂ = 50.
32 The
providers’ true costs are ĉ1 = 41, ĉ2 = 43.5. Evaluating the prices in (17) and (18) at
these costs we see that supplier 1’s price is not competitive enough, because r1 = 47 and
r2 = 46.75.
This example points out that it is not enough to require that c1 < c2, so that the
agents’ conjectures, about how the revised prices are ranked, is fulfilled. In this ex-
ample r1 (c1) < r2 (c2) = 46.5 does not hold and thus supplier 1’s first order condition
does not simplify as assumed in the above derivation of (18). To make sure that this
derivation is valid for all values of costs we need to assume that r1 (c1) ≤ r2 (c2), which
using (17) and (18) can be shown to be equivalent to Condition (C1).
Proof of Theorem 2
First note that, as previously observed, at the price discovery stage, each provider
truthfully reveals (the realization of) his costs, namely pi (ci) = ci. Assume that the
cost for provider 3 is ĉ3, so that suppliers 1 and 2 compete at the contest stage with the
revised reserve price b̂ = ĉ3 + ε. Since we focus on PBE in which all the suppliers select
weakly dominant price reports, there is no loss of generality in restricting our analysis
to Bayesian equilibria of the contest stage subgame. For each of these providers, let




be his strategy, which associates a revised price to each value of his
cost.
Assume that provider 2 with cost c2 believes that 1’s strategy r1 (·) involves the selec-
tion of the lower revised price. Then, selecting the revised price x, supplier 2’s expected
utility is







) [x− c2] f1 (c1) dc1.






Analogously, assume that provider 1 with cost c1 believes that supplier 2 proposes
the higher revised price. Then, selecting the revised price y, his expected utility follows
32 This revised reserve price arises for example from the price discovery stage if there is a third provider
with [c3, c3] = [49.5, 51], supplier 3’s true cost is ĉ3 = 49.9, the initial exogenous budget constraint is
b = 150, and the parameter ε is 0.1. The revised reserve price is hence b̂ = t̂ (P ) + ε = ĉ3 + ε = 50.
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the expression
EU1 (y |r2 (c2) ≥ y ) =
∫ c2
c2





 [y − c1] f2 (c2) dc2.
Maximizing this expression with respect to y, taking into account that 2 chooses strategy
r2 (·) above, we derive the following strategy for supplier 1
r1 (c1) = b̂−
√√√√(b̂− c1)(b̂− E (c2))
4
.
Note that, since r2 is increasing in c2, we have that r2 (c2) ≥ r2 (c2) for all c2 ∈ [c2, c2].
Similarly, as r1 is increasing in c1, for each c1 ∈ [c1, c1], r1 (c1) ≤ r1 (c1). A necessary
condition for the strategies ri (ci) above to constitute a Bayesian equilibrium is that for






which is equivalent to r1 (c1) ≤ r2 (c2). Therefore, for each c1 and any c2, r1 (c1) ≤
r1 (c1) ≤ r2 (c2) ≤ r2 (c2).
Now, assume that the strategies above do not constitute an equilibrium. Therefore,
one of the suppliers is not reacting optimally to his rival’s strategy. Let us consider the
following two cases:
(a) Provider 2 does not react optimally to r1 (·). Then, there should be c2 ∈ [c2, c2]
such that r2 (c2) does not maximize 2’s expected utility. This implies that there is







) (x− c2) f1 (c1) dc1 + ∫ c1
ĉ1





 [x− c2] f1 (c1) dc1.
Note that, since r2 (·) is obtained by maximizing 2’s expected utility conditional on
r2 (c2) ≥ r1 (c1) for each c1, it must be the case that x̂ < r2 (c2). Maximizing the
above expression we get the first order condition
∫ ĉ1
c1
















 f1 (c1) dc1 = 0.
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Since, as previously argued, x̂ < r2 (c2), we have that∫ ĉ1
c1








f1 (c1) dc1 > 0,













 f1 (c1) dc1 < 0;
or c1 = ĉ1 and the above integral trivially becomes 0. Now, consider the integral
















which implies that the integral above is positive. A contradiction.
(b) Provider 1 does not react optimally to r2 (·). Then, there should be c1 ∈ [c1, c1]
such that r1 (c1) does not maximize 1’s expected utility. This implies that there is







) (y − c1) f2 (c2) dc2 + ∫ c2
ĉ2





 [y − c1] f2 (c2) dc2.
Note that the arguments above, concerning supplier 2, can be adapted here to find
a contradiction.
Therefore, it is proven that strategies r1 (·) and r2 (·) constitute a Bayesian equilib-
rium for the contest stage subgame. More than that, our arguments are sufficient to
guarantee that for any two continuous strategies r′1 (·) and r′2 (·) constituting a Bayesian
equilibrium for the contest stage subgame, if r′1 (c1) ≤ r′2 (c2) for any c1 ∈ [c1, c1] and
each c2 ∈ [c2, c2], it must be the case that for each provider i = 1, 2, r′i (·) = ri (·). 
As pointed out in the above constructive proof, when Condition (C1) is satisfied,
there is a natural Bayesian equilibrium for the contest stage. The less efficient provider
believes that his revised price exceeds the one chosen by his rival. Therefore, provider
2 selects a revised price that depends only on his private information. Then, the most
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efficient provider selects his strategy, under the assumption that his revised price is
lower than the one of his rival. This strategy depends on the expected cost of his
rival. Condition (C1) guarantees that the beliefs by the two providers, namely that
r1 (c1) ≤ r2 (c2), are true for any c1 and each c2. When, as illustrated by Example 2,
Condition (C1) is not satisfied and the providers exhibit the “natural” beliefs about
the ranking of revised prices, these beliefs might be not satisfied, contradicting the
equilibrium conditions.
A.3 Incomplete information and loser regret
This Appendix considers the two-stage process of Section 3 with incomplete information
and loser regret. We assume that the price reports at the price discovery stage are made
public and investigate the existence of a symmetric equilibrium in which suppliers report
their marginal costs truthfully at the first stage, so that the contest stage is played under
complete information.
Before formalizing a notion of regret, we investigate the behaviour of providers at
the contest stage. Assume that P is the vector of prices selected at the price discovery
stage, so that b̂ = t̂ (P ) + ε is the endogenous reserve price at the contest stage. Suppose
that providers i and j participate at the contest stage.
Suppose that i believes that he knows the true value of cj, and that he believes to be
able to influence the beliefs of provider j by selecting pi at the price discovery stage. In
other words, at the contest stage j believes that ci = pi.














if cj ≤ pi
Since i anticipates rj (pi) at the contest stage, at the price discovery stage i selects
the price pi that maximizes his profit, conditional on being one of the competitors at
the contest stage. Figure 1 below represents two such functions for b̂ and cj given.
The dotted curve corresponds to the case in which c′i < cj holds, while the solid curve
represents the situation with c′′i > cj. The figure shows that, independently of whether
i is more or less efficient than j, conditional on qualifying for the contest stage, at the
price discovery stage it is optimal for provider i to inflate his signal about his costs.
Suppose that provider j updates his information about his rivals’ costs according to









Figure 1: Supplier i’s profit
updates his beliefs about i’s costs to cji = fj (pi). Figure 2 below shows how j’s revised
price at the contest stage depends on his beliefs about his rival’s costs, cji .
Note that when cji < cj, provider j believes that he is less efficient than his rival.
Therefore, he expects his rival to select a lower revised price rji at the contest stage,





On the other hand, when cji > cj, provider j believes that he is more efficient than his















Figure 2 illustrates that provider j’s revised price selected at the contest stage increases
with his belief about his rival’s cost. Moreover, conditional on being a second stage











Figure 2: How rj varies with c
j
i
Thus, provider i’s price at the price discovery stage must resolve a trade-off. On one
hand, inflating his price above cost might mislead his rival to be less competitive at the
contest stage. But, on the other hand, inflating his price risks not to qualify for the
contest stage. This latter concern is magnified by the introduction of loser regret.
One possible formalization of regret is the following variation of Filiz-Ozbay and
Ozbay (2007). Consider a given supplier, say i, and a price report vector P−i = (pj)j 6=i
of his rivals, and let p(1) and p(2) be the lowest competing prices. More precisely, let
p(1) ≤ p(2) ≤ pj for each j /∈ {(1) , (2) , i}. Consider the following utility of provider i of
participating in the procurement auction
ui (pi |P−i) =

−g (ci − pi) if pi ≤ p(2) < ci and i ∈ C (P )
−g (pi − ci) if ci < p(2) ≤ pi and i /∈ C (P )
Πi otherwise
, (19)
where, for P given, C (P ) is the set of suppliers competing at the contest stage and g (·)
is a strictly increasing function satisfying that g (0) = 0. Notice that when i participates
at the contest stage and pi ≤ p(2) < ci provider i experiences winner regret, while loser
regret occurs when ci < p(2) ≤ pi and i is excluded from the contest stage.
Consider the price discovery stage and suppose that i chooses pi 6= ci, while his rivals
select prices P−i. There are two possibilities.
(a) pi < ci. Supplier i either experiences winner regret and obtains a negative level
of utility, or he has neither winner nor loser regret. In the latter case, the utility
level of i associated to both pi and p′i = ci is the same, and equal to his profit.
Therefore, i has no incentive to select pi < ci at the price discovery stage.
34
(b) pi > ci. As explained before, provider i’s price at the price discovery stage must
resolve the trade-off of inducing his rival to be less competitive at the contest
stage and managing the risk of not qualifying for the contest stage. When the
loser regret is an important enough concern (i.e., when g (·) is high enough for
positive values), the incentive to misreport is counterbalanced.
This completes the argument that when loser regret is an important enough concern,
then misreporting at the discovery stage is not profitable.
A.4 Proof of Proposition 1
We show that deviating from a∗ at any m̃ ∈ [0, 1) a provider can never increase his
profits but in some circumstances may decrease it. Consider a provider, say i, and any
m̃ ∈ [0, 1). Notice that if mi < m̃ holds, then i’s action at m̃ does not affect his profits.
Hence assume that i’s action at each m < m̃ was aim = 0. Consider the following cases,
which exhaust all possibilities.
(a) L (m̃) has at least three providers. If aim̃ = 1, then pi = (1− m̃) b ≥ t̂ (P ),
which implies that sEPi (P ) = 0. Notice that this is true even when there are other
providers who also drop out in this moment. Suppose provider i compares drop-
ping out at m̃ to dropping out at m′ > m̃ and denote by m′′ ≥ m̃ the next moment
in which a provider j 6= i with j ∈ L (m̃) drops out of the auction. There are two
possibilities.
(i) ci ≥ (1− m̃) b. Then m′′ must be such that ci ≥ (1−m′′) b. There are again
two possibilities. If m′ ≤ m′′, then provider i’s share and profits are zero.
If m′ > m′′, then provider i’s share is strictly positive and his profits are
strictly negative, because m′ > m̃ implies that ci > (1−m′) b. Therefore, as
prescribed by (11) and (12), it is optimal to select aim̃ = 1, which guarantees
zero profits.
(ii) ci < (1− m̃) b. There are again two possibilities. If m′′ is such that ci <
(1−m′′) b, then provider i can choose m′ as prescribed by (11) and (12) and
obtain strictly positive profits. Ifm′′ is such that ci ≥ (1−m′′) b, then provider
i can again follow (11) and (12) and choose m′ = 1 − ci/b, guaranteeing
himself zero profits.
This implies that when L (m̃) has at least three providers it is profitable to remain
active until the price reaches marginal costs, as described in (11) and (12).
(b) L (m̃) has two providers. This implies that when the auction closes and all prices
are determined, pi ≤ (1− m̃) b < t̂ (P ). Moreover, at moment m̃ the value of t̂ (P )
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is publicly known. Therefore, by Theorem 4 in Alcalde and Dahm (2013) we have
that i’s optimal decision is as described in (11) and (12).
(c) i is the only provider in L (m̃). This implies that i is the supplier proposing the low-
est price. Again, by Theorem 4 in Alcalde and Dahm (2013), the unique optimal
decision for i is as described in (11) and (12).
This concludes the proof that a∗ is a weakly dominant strategy.
A.5 Multiple Sourcing
This Appendix investigates how the two-stage procedure in Section 3 can be extended
to multiple sourcing. This is of interest, as dual sourcing is a special case of multiple
sourcing and the latter is an important strategy to avoid the risk of lock-in with suppli-
ers.33
To fix ideas suppose the buyer aims to assign shares to 2 ≤ ` < n providers. The case
of ` = 2 corresponds to the setting in Section 3. At the first stage each provider sets a
price pi, so that the vector P = (p1, . . . , pi, . . . , pn) is determined. This allows to compute
t̂` (P ) the (`+ 1)-th lowest price in P . To be precise, t̂` (P ) ∈ {p1, . . . , pi, . . . , pn} is such
that at most ` providers set a price below t̂` (P ) and at least `+1 providers select a price
that does not exceed this threshold. The game ΓE,` is the variation of the two-stage
game ΓE in which ` suppliers are assigned shares. That is, at the price discovery stage
each provider selects a price pi. This determines the endogenous reserve price t̂` (P ).
Each of the ` providers that compete at the contest stage is assigned a share as described
in expression (1).
Although ΓE,` is a simple generalization of ΓE, it turns out that it might not preserve
some of the properties of ΓE. The following Example 3 sheds further light on these
issues. In particular, there might be an equilibrium at which the ordering of prices
differs from the ordering of costs.34
Example 3 At the contest stage there are three suppliers with costs C = (50, 100, 103)
and the fourth lowest price at the price discovery stage is 150. Simple computation
identifies two Nash equilibria, R̂ = (r̂1, r̂2, r̂3) and R̃ = (r̃1, r̃2, r̃3), which are described
in the following table.
33Carpineti et al. (2006) report that multiple awarding by European procurement agencies requires at
least three suppliers. Engel et al. (2006) discuss advantages and drawbacks of multiple sourcing.
34In this example the “locally-envy-free” refinement of Edelman et al. (2007) is violated. This portends
to the possibility of obtaining uniqueness of equilibrium at the contest stage by applying a refinement.
Such an analysis, however, is beyond the scope of this paper and hence relegated to future research.
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Prices Shares Cost
r1 r2 r3 S1 (R) S2 (R) S3 (R)
∑
riSi (R)
R̂ 107.13 121.08 126.50 0.57 0.25 0.18 114.10
R̃ 107.57 125.00 122.33 0.58 0.20 0.23 114.36
Note that at equilibrium R̃ we have that r̃3 < r̃2 holds, even though it is assumed that
c2 < c3.
It follows from the arguments in the proof of Proposition 2 below that conditional on
competing at the contest stage, a provider i can anticipate positive and negative profits
in a similar way as in the case of ` = 2 (as formalised in Observation 1). Consequently,
for each supplier i the truthful price report pi = ci still weakly dominates every other
report at the price discovery stage.
The next result provides an equilibrium at the contest stage.
Proposition 2 The contest stage of the game ΓE,` has a Nash Equilibrium Ro such that
roi ≤ roi+1 for each provider i < `.
Proof. From the arguments above, it follows that providers reveal their costs at the
price discovery stage, i.e. for each i, pi = ci. Therefore, since 0 ≤ c1 < c2 < · · · < c` <
t̂` (P ), providers 1 to ` compete at the contest stage. For notational convenience we set
ro`+1 = t̂` (P ) = c`+1.
Assume that revised prices ri selected at the second stage are increasingly ordered
















Consider the following procedure to obtain an ordered vector Ro of revised prices
for the second stage contestants:
(1) Supplier ` solves the problem
max
r`
(r` − c`)S` (R)
s. t. ∀j < `, rj = 0
}






(2) each i, i < `, solves the problem
max
ri
(ri − ci)Si (R)
s. t. ∀j < i, rj = 0
∀j > i, rj = roj
 (20)



















(ri − ci)Si (R) ,






is constrained to satisfy (a) rj = roj for each j 6= i
and (b) roi−1 ≤ ri ≤ roi+1.
We now show that Ro constitutes a Nash equilibrium for the contest stage subgame.






























as a function of his revised price, satisfies the following properties:

































, where ro0 = 0.
35Unfortunately, for ` ≥ 3, there is no simple analytical expression for ro1 . Nevertheless, since
(r1 − c1)S1 (R) is strictly quasi-concave in r1, program (20) has a unique solution for provider 1. Since
c1 < c2, we have that r1 < r2.
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Therefore, by program (20), it must be the case that r′i > r
o
i−1.




























is decreasing for each ri > ro` , there is no loss of generality in
assuming that r′i ≤ ro` . When i = `− 1, since roi solves program (20), a contradiction is
reached. Otherwise, suppose that ro`−1 < r
′








































is decreasing for each ri > ro`−1, there is no loss
of generality in assuming that r′i ≤ ro`−1. When i = `−2, provided that roi solves program
(20), we obtain a contradiction. Otherwise, we can assume that ro`−2 < r
′
i ≤ ro`−1 and



















which implies that roi−1 ≤ r′i ≤ roi+1, and thus r′i = roi . A contradiction.
Now, let assume that i = 1. In such a case the above arguments can be replicated,




















which is sufficient to reach a contradiction.
We conclude with an illustrative example.
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Example 4 There are n = 7 (potential) providers. The costs are summarized in C =
(38, 65, 71, 74, 80, 100, 145). The initial reserve price is b = 196. The buyer wants to select
the ` = 5 most efficient suppliers. Then, as explained before at the price discovery stage
each supplier sets price pi equal to his cost. Therefore, the revised reserve price at the
second stage is t̂` (P ) = c6 = 100.
To compute the equilibrium described in Proposition 2 we proceed as follows. First,
provider 5 computes the price that maximizes his profits when it is the maximal price
selected by any of the contestants. This price is
ro5 =






Then, provider 4, anticipating that ro5 is 90, computes the price that maximizes his profit,
taking into account that it should not exceed ro5 and that the remaining 3 providers


















and so on. In this way we obtain the vector Ro = (69, 78, 83, 86, 90).
To verify that this constitutes a Nash equilibrium for the contest stage we observe






of provider i, given the prices selected
by his rivals,
(a) is increasing for values ri < roi−1, and
(b) is decreasing for values ri > roi+1.







for roi−1 ≤ ri ≤ roi+1. This best response is precisely roi .
In Figure 3 we plot how the profit of each provider varies as a function of his revised
prices, given his rivals’ revised pricesRo−i. To be precise, for supplier i given, we consider






. As mentioned in the proof of Proposition 2, for each
supplier i participating in the contest stage,
(a) Πoi is continuous in ri;
(b) Πoi is increasing at each ri < r
o
i ;
(c) Πoi is decreasing at each ri > r
o
i ; and
(d) Πoi is differentiable almost everywhere. To be precise, if there is ri at which Π
o
i is




















Figure 3: Supplier i’s profit
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